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DE-LIMITING RULES 
Peter B. Oh* 
Baseball is a game governed by a delicate equilibrium of complex rules.1 
But no rule incites more confusion or controversy than the Infield Fly.2 This 
is perhaps because the rule embodies a greater tension: between a constantly 
evolving game that is steeped in revered traditions, and a rule that has become 
part of popular lore but whose original impetus was premised on a notion of 
fair play that hails from a bygone era.3 
A modern justification for the Infield Fly may lie in its architecture. This 
is the approach taken by Howard Wasserman, who has skillfully sought to 
reverse-engineer the Infield Fly through something he terms a “limiting rule,” 
which can be expressed formally in two statements: 
(1)  A rule is limiting if and only if it constrains a team’s 
ability to gain an inequitable competitive advantage from an 
intentional act that is contrary to ordinary athletic 
expectations; and 
 
(2) A limiting rule is necessary and appropriate if and only if 
a situation exhibits a combination of defined characteristics.4 
According to Wasserman, the Infield Fly is justified because it is a 
unique situation that is subject to a limiting rule. That conclusion, however, 
rests perilously on a near-tautology. This is because the characteristics that 
warrant a limiting rule (2) are essentially the same as those that a rule must 
 
*Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. E-mail: poh@pitt.edu. 
I thank Domingo G. Cruz, Daniel Treuden, Howard M. Wasserman, and the staff of the Florida 
International University Law Review for their comments and suggestions. All errors and wild pitches are 
mine. 
1 See Owen Fiss, The Best of All Games, BOS. REVIEW (Mar. 2008) 
http://bostonreview.net/archives/BR33.2/rawls.php, (referencing a 1981 letter by John Rawls to the 
author).  
2 Unless one considers not a rule, but an exemption, of the game–from the antitrust laws. See, e.g., 
STUART BANNER, THE BASEBALL TRUST: A HISTORY OF BASEBALL’S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION xi (2013) 
(describing the exemption as “one of the oddest features of our legal system,” which “[s]carcely anyone 
believes . . . makes any sense.”). 
3 See generally Richard Hershberger, Revisiting the Origin of the Infield Fly Rule, 47 BASEBALL 
RES. J. 83 (2018). But see, e.g., HAROLD SEYMOUR, BASEBALL: THE EARLY YEARS 187 (1960) (observing 
that, during the 1880s, “[t]he professionals were out to win, and were not overly scrupulous about their 
methods. . . . The most observed rule seemed to be that everything is fair in baseball.”).  
4 HOWARD M. WASSERMAN, THE INFIELD FLY RULE IS IN EFFECT: THE HISTORY AND STRATEGY 
OF BASEBALL’S MOST (IN)FAMOUS RULE 11–12, 54–55 (2019). 
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exhibit to be of the limiting sort (1). Moreover, these characteristics are 
causally interconnected: whenever a player intentionally fails to exert 
ordinary effort, a team gains an inequitable competitive advantage, which in 
turn generates incentives to attempt an intentional misplay.5 Limiting rules—
such as the Infield Fly—thus appear to be justified, by definition. 
Buried within this, though, is a potentially intriguing question. Even if 
limiting rules are a tautology, why must the continued vitality of the Infield 
Fly turn on whether it has a unique status? One response might be that, if the 
Infield Fly is not unique, then it simply can be absorbed within the rules that 
handle other comparable situations.6 This response rests on certain premises, 
which I want to explore briefly here. Specifically, what situations are 
comparable to the Infield Fly? And can all these situations be threaded 
together by one simple rule? By examining these questions we might 
determine whether limiting rules are necessary for the Infield Fly or whether 
it is part of a group of rules that may be justified in another way. 
Within the Official Baseball Rules the Infield Fly is one of fifteen 
discrete ways to retire a batter under Rule 5.09.7 Two other sub-provisions 
within that rule are salient here: Rule 5.09(a)(3) (“Uncaught Third Strike“) 
and Rule 5.09(a)(12) (“Intentional Drop”). “All three of these rules were put 
in place for the purpose of preventing the defense from gaining the unfair 
advantage of earning a ‘cheap’ double play.”8 
Start with the Infield Fly. The core rule and definition can be expressed 
formally: 
(R1) A batter is out if there is a fair fly ball (not including a 
line drive or an attempted bunt) that could be caught by an 
infielder with ordinary effort when there is a force play at 
third base with less than two outs. 
The definition proceeds to elaborate that the “pitcher, catcher, and any 
outfielder who stations himself in the infield” also can be deemed an 
“infielder” within this rule.9 But this elaboration is incorrect. The Infield Fly 
is not restricted to only the “fair” infield; any qualifying “fly ball,” even one 
that falls into the outfield, can be subject to the rule. Moreover, any player 
can be stationed anywhere, because the relevant inquiry is entirely 
 
5 Id. at 54–55. 
6 Id. at 12. 
7 See MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, OFFICIAL BASEBALL RULES 5.09(a) (2018) [hereinafter OBR]. 
8 Larry Gallagher, A Comparison of Three Rules, NW. UMPIRES: LARRY’S CORNER, 
http://www.nwumpires.com/home/index.php/larryscorner/19-rulesarea/39-lg4 (last visited Mar. 21, 
2019). 
9 OBR, supra note 7, at 145. 
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subjunctive, that is, whether the ball could be caught by an infielder with 
ordinary effort. 
And this inquiry includes balls that could be caught by a catcher. If the 
Infield Fly and Uncaught Third Strike truly feature an “identical structure and 
logic,”10 then parsimony would seem to point towards consolidating (R1) and 
Rule 5.09(a)(3). The scope of these rules, however, differs in at least two 
material respects. Unlike the Uncaught Third Strike, the Infield Fly is 
confined to a narrower range of situations, involving only “fair fly balls” and 
a force play at third base. A consolidated rule thus would entail either 
reconciling these variations or redesigning the universe of applicable 
situations. 
There is another option. Eliminate Rule 5.09(a)(3). Nothing would be 
lost as a result, because the content of that rule concurrently exists in the form 
of Rule 5.05(a)(2): 
Rule 5.05(a)(2): “The batter becomes a runner when . . . 
[t]he third strike called by the umpire is not caught, 
providing (1) first base is unoccupied, or (2) first base is 
occupied with two out….” 
 
Rule 5.09(a)(3): “A batter is out when . . . [a] third strike is 
not caught by the catcher when first base is occupied before 
two are out….” 
When either of these rules is read in conjunction with Rule 5.09(a)(2),11 
the Uncaught Third Strike remains intact. One might be tempted to think that 
the decision about which rule to eliminate is a case of Buridan’s Ass, but it 
is actually a case of Occam’s Razor. To eliminate Rule 5.05(a)(2) would track 
back to the task of reconciling 5.09(a)(3) with (R1), and so ceteris paribus the 
simpler path is just to eliminate Rule 5.09(a)(3), which would entail no 
further work. 
This leaves the Intentional Drop. In its original form this rule applied to 
the same situations as the Infield Fly but only to outfielders.12 Over time the 
Intentional Drop has been expanded to include both line drives and fair fly 
balls, as well as force plays at both second and third base. In these respects 
the Intentional Drop and Uncaught Third Strike share the same kinds of 
differences with the Infield Fly, whose narrower scope suggests that it may 
be the outlier within the triad. 
 
10 WASSERMAN, supra note 4, at 92. 
11 Rule 5.09(a)(2) provides that a batter is out when “[a] third strike is legally caught by the 
catcher….” OBR, supra note 7, at 40. 
12 See Gallagher, supra note 8. 
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A closer inspection of the Infield Fly only reinforces this impression. 
Unlike the Uncaught Third Strike, the Infield Fly excludes bunts and line 
drives; and, unlike the other rules, the Infield Fly applies only when there is 
a force play at third base with less than two outs. In both cases the limitations 
suffer from the same weakness: their rationales are grounded in probabilities 
and not principles. Within Wasserman’s cost-benefit framework, for 
instance, bunts and line drives should be set aside from the Infield Fly 
because they may be too hard or easy, respectively, for an infielder to drop 
the ball and then turn a double play;13 similarly, the argument against 
extending the Infield Fly to force plays at second base largely rests on how 
difficult a double play might be if an ordinary batter properly hustles to first.14 
But in either case, whatever the chances might be for a double play, a 
successful one still will be “cheap” and militate towards some form of 
redress.15 
One might try to distinguish the Intentional Drop on the basis that it 
results in a dead ball. But for years, like the Infield Fly and the Uncaught 
Third Strike, an intentionally dropped ball was still live;16 that rule eventually 
was changed because baserunners frequently were confused about whether 
they had to advance, which in turn left them exposed to a potential “cheap” 
double play.17 So what seems to set the Intentional Drop apart actually 
reflects its shared purpose with the Uncaught Third Strike and the Infield Fly 
and suggests a potential avenue towards consolidating all of them into one 
rule:  
(R2) A batter is out if a fair or live ball could be intentionally 
dropped by an infielder with ordinary effort in order to 
attempt a double play with less than two outs. 
Whether this formulation truly captures the essence of all three rules, or 
whether no amount of additions or refinement could ever achieve that goal, 
is something that certainly can be argued further. Regardless, the object of 
this exercise is to suggest that the Infield Fly is hardly unique; it reflects a 
concern that is mirrored by the Uncaught Third Strike and the Intentional 
Drop, and yet does not necessitate a limiting rule. 
 
13 See WASSERMAN, supra note 4, at 69–74. 
14 Id. at 66–68. 
15 This would be even more so if rules such as the Infield Fly were viewed through the prism of 
unjust enrichment and not perverse incentives. But cf. RIGHTEOUS KILL (Grosvenor Park Productions 
2008) (Al Pacino as Rooster: “I love [the Infield Fly] rule. It assumes the worst in everybody.”). 
16 In 1939, for instance, Rule 32 defined when “The Ball is Dead and Not in Play.” Neither the 
Infield Fly, Uncaught Third Strike, nor the Intentional Drop falls within this Rule. See MAJOR LEAGUE 
BASEBALL: FACTS AND FIGURES AND OFFICIAL RULES 218 (Bob Elson ed., 1939). 
17 See Gallagher, supra note 8. 
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But this is not my ultimate point. What truly matters is that the ongoing 
debate about the Infield Fly presents another opportunity, if not another 
reason, for fans to congregate and celebrate this wonderful game. Baseball 
has been enriched by the contributions from Howard Wasserman in all these 
respects. 
 
